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Authorization of Involuntary Blood Transfusion for Adult
Jehovah's Witness Held Unconstitutional-In re Brooks'
Estate*
Despite serious illness, plaintiff requested, in accordance with her
religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness,1 that blood transfusions not
be administered to her.2 Upon the request of her physician and
several assistant state's attorneys, a court-appointed guardian was
authorized to consent to a blood transfusion for the plaintiff, and a
transfusion was administered. On appeal of the court's action to the
Supreme Court of Illinois, held, order reversed. 3 The authorization
of a blood transfusion for an adult Jehovah's Witness who has only

• 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
I. The belief that blood transfusions are a violation of the law of God is derived
from a literal reading of such biblical passages as Genesis 9:3,4: "Only flesh with its
soul-its blood-you must not eat," and Leviticus 17:13,14: "You must not cat the blood
of any sort of flesh, because the soul of every sort of flesh is in its blood." WATClt
TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT Soc'y OF PA., BLOOD, MEDICINE AND nm LAW OF GOD 4 (1961).
2. The plaintiff and her husband also signed a document releasing her physician
and the hospital from all civil liability that might result from the failure to admin•
ister blood transfusions to her. In re Brooks' Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ill. 1965)
(hereinafter cited as principal case).
3. Since the transfusion had been administered before the appeal was taken, the
guardian argued that the appeal should be dismissed for mootness. The court disposed
of this contention by quoting the language of an earlier Jehovah's Witness case,
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622-23, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1952):
"[W]hen the issue presented is of substantial public interest, a well-recognized exception exists to the general rule that a case which has become moot will be dismissed
on appeal. • • . Among the criteria considered in determining the existence of the
requisite degree of public interest are the public or private nature of the question
presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance
of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question," Principal
case at 438.
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adult children is an unconstitutional interference with the patient's
right to the free exercise of her religion. 4
In compliance with the state's duty as parens patriae to protect
the welfare of minors, 5 the courts have consistently authorized the
administration of blood transfusions to children whose parents have
refused, on the basis of their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses,
to consent to such treatment. 6 The courts' parens patriae jurisdiction
4. Although the question frequently arises, it is uncertain whether refusal to
submit to a life-saving transfusion might constitute suicide. The uncertainty is due
primarily to the distinction between misfeasance-suicide in the customary sense-and
nonfeasance, the refusal of the transfusion. Moreover, the patient does not actively
wish to die, but merely to live in accordance with his beliefs. If such an act does constitute suicide, and suicide is a crime in the particular jurisdiction, then one's religious
beliefs would not be a defense. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where
the Supreme Court held that the accused's religious beliefs were not a justification for
polygamy. Although its status varies greatly among the states, suicide is not treated as
criminal in most jurisdictions. See 40 N.C.L. REv. 323 (1963).
In this regard, it is interesting to note the relevant provisions of the 1961 District
of Columbia Code. Section ~-1301 provides that cancer (including leukemia) and
all other malignant growths be reported to the director of public health. However, persons suffering from these diseases cannot be compelled to submit to medical
treatment. § 6-1303. Moreover, § 6-118 gives the Commissioners of the District of
Columbia broad powers to prevent the spread of communicable diseases including the
power, pursuant to § 6-119h, to order treatment. However, § 6-119i prohibits the
authorities from compelling a person who relies in good faith on spiritual means or
prayer in treatment of disease to submit to medical treatment. Thus, Congress has
decided that, in the District of Columbia, medical treatment cannot be forced upon an
individual against his will or against his religious beliefs, even though death may
result from the lack of treatment.
5. In England, the king was the parens patriae-the general guardian of all infants, incompetents, and insane persons. This sovereign prerogative and duty came
to be exercised by Chancery on behalf of the crown. When the United States achieved
its independence, this sovereign power of guardianship over persons under a disability
devolved upon the states. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854) (Taney,
J., concurring). See Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60, 71 (1950); In re
Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 121, 145 Pac. 871, 872 (1915); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126
P .2d 765, 777 (1942). A duty is thus imposed on the state to protect persons who
are under a disability, such as minors, incompetents, and insane persons. Warner Bros.
Pictures v. Brode!, 179 P.2d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 430,
114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955); Mdntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. I, 9, 205 Pac. 917, 925 (1922). For
example, a child becomes a ward of the state whenever his life or health is endangered
because of parental neglect, ignorance, poverty, or viciousness. In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc.
948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941). Normally, the exercise of this power involves
civil matters relating to contract and property rights of infants or incompetents and
the supervision of the personal custody of infants when necessary. For examples of
equity jurisdiction in cases involving custody of children, see Arnold v. Arnold, 246
Ala. 86, 18 So. 2d 730 (1944), and Helton v. Crawley, supra.
However, the state's power as parens patriae also extends to matters involving the
personal liberty of persons who are under a disability such as infancy, incompetency,
habitual drunkenness, or imbecility. This power is exercised whenever such persons
could be a danger to themselves or to others if they were not held under the protective
custody of the state. Johnson v. State, supra. Thus, the state may bring a minor child
before a juvenile court for commitment to a state industrial school, In re Turner, 94
Kan. 115, 145,Pac. 871 (1915), or commit an insane person to an institution, In re Ryan,
47 F. Supp. 10, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
6. E.g., People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Morrison v. State,
252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied,
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over minors emanates from the statutory power of juvenile courts to
provide for the protection and control of minors, 7 and allows the
courts, under appropriate circumstances, to substitute their authority
for that of a child's parents.8
Recognizing the utility of the parens patriae concept in this
setting, the courts have not hesitated to extend the doctrine to save
the lives of unyielding parents where minor children are involved.
Thus, one court ordered that a transfusion be given a pregnant
mother, despite her religious beliefs to the contrary, on the theory
that the welfare of the mother. and of the unborn child were so
inseparable that it would be impractical to distinguish between
them. 9 Then, in the landmark case of Application of the President
& Directors of Georgetown College, 10 a United States Circuit Judge
ordered a transfusion for an adult Jehovah's Witness who was the
mother of a minor child.11 Although the case differed from previous
cases in that the transfusion was authorized to save only the life of
the parent rather than that of the child, one of the primary bases for
the decision was again the parens patriae doctrine; the judge expressed concern for the welfare of the minor child should its mother
die, and for the parent's responsibility to the community to care for
her child.12
In the principal case, the court faced a situation in which
371 U.S. 890 (1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961): In re
Santos, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.~d 450 (1962); In re Clark, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 21,
185 N.E.2d 128 (1962); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
7. See. e.g., CAL. WELFARE CODE § 600; CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 17-59 (1958); ILL,
REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2001 (1963); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 53 (1957); Mo. REV, STAT.
§§ 211.011, .031 (Supp. 1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2a:4-34 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-21
(1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-10 (1960); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN, §§ 2157.07, .33 (Page
1954). However, since the power of the state over children as parens patriae is derived
from ancient chancery jurisdiction, the right of the state to exercise this guardianship
does not depend solely on statutes conferring that power and thus is not limited by
such statutes. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765, 777 (1942).
8. The most common example of this intervention is court-authorized medical
treatment for a neglected child. E.g., In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) (surgery on a deformed foot); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263
N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (removal of eye infected with malignant growth); Mitchell v. Davis,
205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (medical treatment for arthritis and rheumatic
fever); see Scheib, Compulsory Medical Attention, 13 N.Y.U. INTRA, L. REv. 79 (1957);
13 WYO. L.J. 88 (1959).
9. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A,2d
537 (1964). Cf. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH, L. REv. 579 (1965).
10. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for rehearing en bane denied, 331 F,2d
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President &: Directors of George•
town College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
11. The Georgetown decision has been the subject of extensive comment. See
generally 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 399 (1965); 113 u. PA. L. REV. 290 (1964); 9 UTAH L. REV.
161 (1964). The procedural aspects of the case are noted in 64 MICH, L. REv. 324 (1965);
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 706 (1964).
12. Application of President&: Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F,2d 1000,
1008 (1964).
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an adult Jehovah's Witness having no minor children refused a
blood transfusion on the basis of her religious beliefs.13 · Since no
minor children were involved, the court distinguished Georgetown14
and, having thus eliminated the parens patriae argument, faced the
question of whether the free exercise clause of the first amendment
prohibits compelling such an adult to submit to a blood transfusion.
The historical background of the first amendment indicates that
its framers intended to prevent the civil magistrate from becoming
the arbiter of religious convictions, for fear he would inevitably make
his own beliefs the standard of judgment and impose them on
others. 15 Realizing that complete freedom in the exercise of religious
convictions was untenable, however, Jefferson felt that this right
could be restricted if the individual's religious acts were injurious to
others.16
The Supreme Court has adopted a balancing approach in first
amendment cases, weighing the importance of the right to the free
exercise of one's religious beliefs against the demands of other compelling interests. Thus, in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States11 the
Court determined that although the government cannot interfere with
religious beliefs, it can interfere with certain religious practices.18
In attempting to define the extent of the right to the free exercise of
religion, the Court has held that activities in pursuit of that right
may be restricted only when they endanger "peace and good order" 111
13. The court indicated that this question was one of first impression. Principal
case at 438. However, Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct.
1962) reached the same conclusion on the same issue in a. terse, one-page opinion.
14. Principal case at 440.
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878); PADOVER, THE COMPLETE
MADISON 300 (1953).
,,,16. PATIERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLFS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 182 (1953).
17. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
18. Id. at 166. The court implied in Reynolds that the government could interfere
to prevent a human sacrifice which was required as part of a religious ceremony, or to
prevent a wife from burning herself upon the funeral pyre of her dead husband in
accordance with the dictates of her religion. These hypotheticals are distinguishable
from the situations presented in the principal case and in Georgetown; to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, death is not a religiously-commanded goal but rather an undesirable side
effect of adherence to a religious tenet. See Application of President &: Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The faith of the
Jehovah's Witness does not demand his death but nither emphasizes the primacy of
life. See WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRAcr Soc'y OF PA., op. cit. supra note 1, introduction by publisher (1961).
19. "In the preamble of this act Uefferson's 'Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom1 •.• after a recital 'that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers
into the field of opinion, •.. is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious
liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace
and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what
properly belongs to the church and what to the state." Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 163 (1898).
The individual's refusal to serve on a jury because of his religious beliefs does not
constitute a "breaking out into overt acts against peace and good order." United States
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or present a "grave and immediate danger" 20 to the "safety, health or
morals of the community;"21 only when such activities endanger
paramount interests may they be limited.22 The court in the principal case therefore reasoned that the patient had a constitutional right
to refuse to submit to a blood transfusion, since the interest of the
state in protecting the free exercise of religion was not overcome by
the existence of any grave and immediate danger to a community
interest requiring the state to intercede.23
Still another element was added to the balancing process as it
relates to compulsory blood transfusions in United States v. George,2 4
a case identical on its facts with Georgetown. Although the court
reached the same conclusion, ordering a transfusion for the parent
of minor children, it slighted the constitutional issue by saying that
Georgetown presented some helpful guidelines; Georgetown's rationale, where applicable, was adopted. In addition to the factors
weighed in Georgetown, however, the court added that in such circumstances the constitutional right of free exercise of religion did
not justify requiring a doctor to ignore the mandates of his conscience and his professional oath.25 The court was unclear as to the
actual weight to be given this interest. Assigning it sufficient importance to outweigh the right to the free exercise of religion would
require reversal of the decision in the principal case, regardless of the
inapplicability of the parens patriae doctrine. The fallacy of such a
v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612, 615 (E.D. Wash. 1943); see In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136,
125 N.W.2d 588 (1963), following remand of 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), vacating 265
Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963).
20. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The "grave
and immediate danger" statement of Barnette is a restatement of the "clear and
present danger" test enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1918). State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860,239 P,2d 545
(1952). To permit a Christian Scientist to enter a university without having a chest
X-ray would present a grave and immediate danger to the rest of the students, State
ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, supra, but the refusal of a pupil, on the basis of his
religious beliefs, to stand for the singing of the national anthem presents no clear
and present danger to the community and consequently cannot be restricted. Sheldon v.
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
21. An individual cannot refuse compulsory vaccination, required for the protection
of the public health, on religious grounds. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944). A statute prohibiting the sale of magazines on a specific street on Saturday
during hours in which the street was particularly congested has been held not to violate
the first amendment rights of individuals selling religious pamphlets, since the statute
was sufficiently necessary for the public safety so as to outweigh the right to exercise
one's religion in this manner. Jones v. City of Moultrie, 196 Ga. 526, 27 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
22. "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice in this highly sensitive constitutional area. '[O]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita•
tion.' Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 [1945].'' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
23. Principal case at 442.
24. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
25. Ibid.
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result is obvious in view of established precedent. In the parens
patriae situation, the courts say in effect that the interest of society in
the welfare of minors outweighs its interest in the free exercise of
religion. It cannot be asserted, however, that the interest of society
in the canons of ethics of any particular profession outweighs its
interest in the "canons" of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
doctor's nonfulfillment of his professional oath cannot be viewed as
a danger equivalent to those found to be sufficiently "grave and
immediate" in previous cases so as to override first amendment
guarantees.
It is arguable that in certain situations the parens patriae concept, as applied in the Georgetown decision, at least inferentially
provides bases for court-ordered transfusions even to adult patients
having no minor children. It was stated in Georgetown that where
the patient is in extremis and non compos mentis, it may be the
duty of the court, even though aware of his religious objections, to
assume guardianship of him to the extent of ?,Uthorizing treatment
to save his life.26 Such a doctrine, however, might lead a doctor to
wait until the patient had become so weak as to be incompetent to
render· a considered decision, and then apply for the necessary court
order. This means of circumventing the constitutional guarantee
should not be permitted, especially where the patient, before becoming so weak as to be adjudged incompetent, had requested that no
transfusions be administered. Of course, in an emergency, if the
doctor were unaware of the patient's religious beliefs he would be
entitled to presume that the patient had no religious objections to
the administration of blood transfusions.
Despite the limitations imposed by the principal case,27 it is
unclear how broadly the courts are willing to construe the parens
patriae doctrine in order to preserve a life in similar situations. The
possibility of further extension arises from the fact that the parens
patriae authority of the state encompasses not only minors but also
any adult who is under a disability.28 Emphasizing the welfare of the
child, the judge in Georgetown acted to preserve the life of the
parent.29 Under this approach, a broad reading of the parens patriae
26. Application of President 8: Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (1964).
27. Although parens patriae is not mentioned in the principal case, the court
clearly relied on it to distinguish Georgetown on the ground that minor children· were
involved in that case. Principal case at 440.
28. See note 5 supra.
29. "The state, as parens patriae will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so
it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The patient had
a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus the people had an interest in preserving the life of this mother." Application of President 8: Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (1964).
It is interesting to consider whether this language might not provide authority for a
court order, based upon the interest of the state, as parens patriae, in the welfare of
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concept could lead to the conclusion that whenever any person under
a disability, such as an incompetent adult child, is dependent upon
the adult patient, the court could order the transfusion to protect
the welfare of the person under the disability.
The court in the principal case, rather than emphasizing the
welfare of the child, felt that the overriding interest of the state
arises from the fact that, if the parent does not live, the child may
become a ward of the state.30 Many states have statutes81 which, in
order to relieve the public of the burden of caring for disabled
persons, impose a duty upon individuals to maintain relatives who
are incapable of supporting themselves.32 Thus, it has been held that
a parent is obligated to support an adult child who is incapable of
self-support.33 Where such an obligation to care for another is
imposed by statute, as well as in the parens patriae setting, the state
may have an overriding interest in preserving the life of the patient
if upon his death the person for whom he is responsible might
become a ward of the state.
Even in the absence of any parens patriae argument, the tendency
of the courts to dispose of these cases on their particular facts could
lead to circumstances in which the interest of the state in the life
of a particular individual might outweigh the state's interest in
protecting the free exercise of religion. For example, if the patient
were an atomic scientist directing a project of strategic significance
equal to that of the Manhattan Project, or a virologist nearing the
perfection of a vaccine which would have an impact comparable to
that of the Salk vaccine, would the public safety and health justify
authorizing a transfusion for such an individual against his will? It is
arguable that in such a case the real danger lies in the emphasis on
the general welfare at the expense of the individual, particularly in
her other children, to save the life of a Roman Catholic mother rather than that of
her child where the choice is necessitated -in childbirth.
30. Principal case at 440.
31. E.g., N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 44:1-140 (1934), which provides that the father, grand•
father, mother, grandmother, children, grandchildren, and husband or wife of a poor,
old, lame, or blind person shall at their expense maintain the poor person, See also
N.J. REv. STAT. § 44:1-141 (Supp. 1953), which provides that if any relative mentioned
above fails to support the poor person or if the poor person is supported at public
expense, the relative may be required to pay such sum as will maintain him and relieve
the public of that burden and that the county may recover any money due for relief
of the poor person.
32. In Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d ~20
(1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194, on remand, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321
(1965), a California statute making a child liable for the support of his parent in a state
institution was held unconstitutional. Since mental hospitals serve a public function,
it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the fourteentl1
amendment to burden arbitrarily one class of society, e.g., an incompetent's children,
with the patient's expenses. See 63 MICH. L. REV. 562 (1965).
33. Strom v. Strom, 13 IIL App. 2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957).
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the sensitive area of religious freedom. 84 Moreover, the standards for
such considerations might well be too vague, and the discretion of
the court too great, in a situation in which clearly defined standards
are necessary because a life is ebbing away with the passing of every
moment devoted to argumentation and deliberation. Furthermore,
it is questionable whether the civil magistrate should be permitted
to be the judge of the relative value to s_ociety of individual lives.
Thus, although it would appear that the decision in the principal
case is constitutionally correct, there may well be factors present in
other cases involving an adult patient with no minor children which
would lead to the authorization of a blood transfusion in violation
of the religious beliefs of the patient.
34. "We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities which
we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes. • • • [The rea~ test of the freedom to differ is] the right to differ as to
things which touch the heart of the existing order." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

